Command structure is one of th... free essay sample

Command structure is one of the most important aspect of any military operation. A clear and obvious command structure failed to manifest during Operation Anaconda. Confusing command relationships without a unity of command and a unity of effort along with overlapping responsibilities and conflicting command relationships brought tension to the mission. In the report Operation Anaconda Lessons for Joint Operations, Kugler states, Clear-cut command structures and command relationships must be established and understood by participating component units to ensure proper integration and compliance with planning directives (Richard L. Kugler, 2009). Operation Anaconda did not benefit from the command structure because the ground forces were located in the area of operations while the commands were in the Persian Gulf and in Tampa, Florida.U.S. ground forces The ground forces in Afghanistan were under the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) led by General Tommy Franks stationed in MacDill AFB, Florida. Command structure is one of the most important aspect of any operation, and from here the chain of command splits into multi commands with no clear control structure. We will write a custom essay sample on Command structure is one of th or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page This command structure caused breaks in communication affecting the basics of war such as surprise and maneuver. Richard Kuglers take on command structure is A hallowed principle of war is unity of command that is military campaigns and battles should be commanded by a single senior officer with the authority and staff assets to blend the operations of all components into a single, cohesive plan (Kugler, 2007). Army Maj. Gen. Franklin Hagenbeck the commander of the 10th Mountain Division, led Task Force Mountain, and his boss was Lieutenant General Paul Mikolashek, head of all land forces in the theater. General Mikolashek ran his office out of Camp Doha, Kuwait. CENTCOM named General Hagenbecks headquarters Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain, in an attempt to give him additional control. In the paper Operation Anaconda Overview Hagenbeck oversaw all coalition conventional land forces, as well as some special forces, but did not command the air elements, CIA operatives or certain special operations forces in Afghanistan (Hawkins, 2013). This lack of control hurt the planning phase as well as the coordination of the mission; in the end, General Hagenbeck could only request airstrikes. Task Force 11 Task Force 11 commanded by Air Force Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, reported directly to General Franks. The task force, made up of the Army Delta Force and Navy SEALs, was a key unit for advanced force operations, conducting reconnaissance and strikes against high value targets. Task force 11 remained outside General Hagenbecks command, and communication and coordination between the two entities suffered.U.S. air component forces Lieutenant General Chuck Wald at the beginning of Operation Anaconda led U.S. air component forces; Lieutenant General Michael Moseley replaced him in early November 2001. There was not a forward air command element in Afghanistan; instead, the command ran the operation from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. The lack of commanders on ground led to vast confusion during the operation. Afghan forces Afghan forces led by General Zia Lodin operated under their own command structure not following the typical Army principles. Afghan commanders, Kamal Khan (K-Khan) and Zakim Khan (Z-Khan) would led their forces and would hold key blocking positions. The Afghan forces were deliberately left out of planning for the battle and informed of the operation only at the last possible moment in order to enhance operational security (Edgar Fleri, Ernest Howard, Hukill, ; Searle, 2003). Not being under U. S. command, the Afghan forces could depart from the original plan if they wanted to. They did in some instances, and hurt the operation in doing so. Commands CENTCOM worked from FL. through two subordinate commands, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). Even with the advancements of technology, there is still a requirement for a forward C2 structure that ensures proper resources are deployed, situational awareness is maintained, and tactical operations are conducted effectively (Richard L. Kugler, 2009). Commanders need to have control of the situation and have awareness, despite having the technology of today. Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) Army LTG Paul Mikolashek led Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) from a base in Camp Doha in Kuwait. During the planning, a senior air operations liaison was not part of the staff until just prior to the battle, and they did not involve the air component in planning for the operation. When operations launch at a distant location, there is a lack of command and control, leaving a huge variable out of the equation. Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) U.S. Air Force Lt Gen Michael Moseley led Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC) from his headquarters at Prince Sultan Airbase in Saudi Arabia. Not involved in the initial planning, CFACC did not make prior arrangements for fuel before the operation started. This left them scrambling to provide the necessary support when the operation order came out, trying to obtain the necessary supplies. During the first few days of the operation, CFACC retained command authority for all strikes, eventually turning it over to TF Mountain in the last few days. Task Force Dagger Army COL John Mulholland of Armys Fifth Special Operations Group led Task Force Dagger, working with friendly Afghan troops and spotted for the air strikes. TF Dagger maintained operational control (OPCON) over their air assets, but confusion arose over who actually had tactical control (TACON) of the AC-130s. With the multi-level command structure, questions arose and clear command guidance would have saved time. Conclusion A clear and obvious command structure failed to manifest during Operation Anaconda. The mission was an overall success in terms of mission accomplishment of clearing al Qaeda fighters out of the Shah-i-Kot Valley in Afghanistan per reports. Operation Anaconda did not benefit from the command structure because the ground forces were located in the area of operations while the commands were in the Persian Gulf and in Tampa, Florida.